How long will terrorism last

The issue most likely to fracture the coalition is Iraq. President Bush quickly ruled out that option. Making Iraq the subject of military attack in a second phase of the campaign against terrorism poses problems for the Bush administration.

The United States would almost certainly have to carry out the attack on its own and perhaps even without access to bases in the Persian Gulf area, making it far more difficult to win. Russia, which has provided Washington with considerable intelligence cooperation since the crisis began, has good relations with Baghdad. To make matters worse for the administration, these same constraints hold with respect to using military force against Iran or Syria, two countries that have actively sponsored and harbored terrorist groups like Lebanon-based Hezbollah.

Iraq, Iran, and Syria are not the only issues that could fracture the antiterrorism coalition. Should military operations in Afghanistan drag on, or result in large numbers of civilian deaths, the Bush administration could find itself under increasing pressure abroad to end the mission prematurely.

The challenge facing the Bush administration in the near term is to strike the proper balance between its short-term military objectives in Afghanistan and elsewhere and its longer term objective to sustain the international cooperation necessary to conduct a successful fight against global terrorism.

In doing so, it will attempt to make the mission define the coalition, rather than letting the coalition define the mission. But it may then find itself confronting what every administration fears: what it wants to do, and perhaps should do, does not mesh with what it can do on its own.

There may be times in the campaign against terrorism-as during the cold war itself-when going it alone is both necessary and desirable, but this should be the exception rather than the rule. Ultimately, the fight against global terrorism is one that the United States cannot win on its own. The second step Washington must take is to improve homeland security. Much of the focus will understandably be on spending more money on the problem, but the immediate challenge will be to ensure that money is spent wisely.

And here the core challenge is to organize the government so that it is more effective in providing homeland security. As Dwight D.

President Bush moved swiftly to address the organizational issue. Critics countered that a White House coordinator, even one who was a friend of the president, could not begin to meet the challenge facing the country. They argued that Ridge would have clout only if he were given control of agency budgets or was put in charge of a newly created, cabinet-level department for homeland security that consolidated existing government operations.

Proposals along these lines work better in theory than in practice, however. Contrary to the critics, control of budgets or command of an agency is not necessary, or even sufficient, to exercise power in the federal government. National security advisers possess neither, yet no one doubts their authority. Nor is centralization necessarily the proper prescription. Customs agents need to know what to look for at the border, Coast Guard commanders need to know which ships to interdict, and Immigration and Naturalization Service officers need to know who is to be barred entry.

Intelligence officers need to know which pieces of information culled from an overload of data fit together to enable pre-emptive actions. Hospital emergency-room doctors need to know what symptoms indicate possible exposure to a biological attack.

Trying to cram these various agencies, and their diverse missions, into a single organization could make the government less effective in battling terrorism, not more. Another problem with centralization proposals is the sheer number of federal agencies with a stake in counterterrorism-a number that ranges from 46 to , depending on who counting. Short of making the entire federal government a counterterrorism agency, that means that any consolidation must be selective.

Some agencies and functions critical to the counterterrorism task cannot, by their very nature, be consolidated. Further complicating matters is that formal consolidation does not guarantee effective integration.

The Department of Energy is the classic cautionary lesson: it was created in to bring a variety of units under one umbrella, but a quarter of a century later its integration remains far from complete and its effectiveness often questioned. Instead, he would, in the eyes of other agencies, simply become another bureaucratic competitor for money and influence.

Thus, the Bush approach of having Ridge coordinate domestic agencies much as the national security adviser coordinates foreign policy agencies makes more sense. His job certainly is more difficult in one key respect: the national security adviser must worry about getting coordinated information to the president in a timely fashion, whereas Ridge must concern himself mainly with how the agencies operate in the field.

One factor working in his favor is that September 11 made counterterrorism a priority across all agencies. They not only know that it is a critical mission but also that it is the key to bigger budgets and more authority.

The challenge facing Ridge is to forge the channels of formal and informal agency cooperation where they do not exist today-both among domestic agencies and between them and the national security apparatus. Within this coordination framework some agency consolidation may make sense for example, combining agencies with closely related functions such as the Customs Service, Border Patrol and Coast Guard.

Even if Washington gets organizational matters right, it will not be enough. Several of the September 11 hijackers were in the United States on expired student visas. Others entered even though they were suspected of ties to Al Qaeda. But to speak of better border enforcement is to acknowledge the difficulty of the task. Millions of people enter the United States each year, legally and illegally, and only a few have any interest in committing terrorist attacks. Shiraz Maher from Kings College London's International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation believes this war has helped spawn many of today's other problems in society.

So you can see a cascading series of consequences. So I think it's fair to say that the 'War on Terror' is far from over in many senses. So will there ever be an end to this amorphous campaign? Will there be a decisive "Mission Accomplished" moment that brings the so-called War on Terror to a close?

It is unlikely. Because, like crime, terrorism can only be reduced to what officials call "manageable levels". And today there is already a newly emerging threat, that of far-right extremism, something that will likely breathe new life into what appears to be a War without End.

Image source, Reuters. The Telegraph: How many people are killed by terrorist attacks in the UK? Public Radio International: Terrorists launched fewer attacks in But they took twice as many hostages. Global News: Canadians are concerned refugees pose a terror threat. Should they be worried? Newsweek: Can we predict where terrorists will strike next? CNN: The return of leftist terrorism? Washington Post: Yes, the media do underreport some terrorist attacks.

Just not the ones most people think of. PolitiFact: Claim: Odds of fatal refugee terror attack 3. Terrorist assassinations by region, target Featured Research. Information on terrorist assassinations from the Global Terrorism Database News. World Economic Forum: Terrorists want to destroy our cities.

We can't let them. Washington Post: Will next week's U. Here's what environmental extremists can teach us. PBS Newshour: How worried should you be about terrorism? The Conversation: What is terrorism, and is it getting worse? USA Today: Sept. Washington Times: U. World Economic Forum: After 15 years of terror, are we any safer? In the West, Yes.

In the World, No. Vox: You may think the world is falling apart. Steven Pinker is here to tell you it isn't. Center for Strategic and International Studies: U. FiveThirtyEight: Terrorist attacks in the U. Washington Post: Are lone wolves or terrorist groups more deadly? Terrorist attacks show biggest decline in a decade; but let's wait before celebrating Discussion Point. Brookings Institution: The U. Bloomberg News: Terror stalks commuters as foiled plots show U.

Is This Terrorism? Discussion Point. Terrorist attacks involving firearms more likely to be lethal than other types of attacks Featured Research. Global Terrorism Database researchers say overall terrorism trends often defy conventional wisdom News. Sri Lanka recorded the deadliest attack of when eight coordinated suicide attacks across the country targeted churches and hotels on Easter Sunday, killing people and injuring at least South Asia remains the region most impacted by terrorism in , despite the improvements in Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

This is the second year in a row that South Asia has recorded more deaths from terrorism than any other region. Terrorism comes with a heavy financial cost. Whilst this figure is a small percentage of the total impact of violence on the global economy, it should be noted that the figures for terrorism are highly conservative as they do not account for many items, including the indirect impacts on business and investment, insurance costs, lost opportunity and the costs associated with security agencies in countering terrorism.

One of the more worrying trends in the last five years is the surge in far-right political terrorism, even though the absolute number of far-right attacks remains low when compared to other forms of terrorism. In North America, Western Europe, and Oceania, far-right attacks have increased by per cent since , with deaths increasing by per cent over the same period.

There were 89 deaths attributed to far-right terrorists in , with 51 of those occurring in the Christchurch mosque attacks in New Zealand. There have been over 35 far-right terrorist incidents in the West every year for the past five years.

Far-right terrorism tends to be more lethal than far-left terrorism, but not as lethal as Islamist terrorism in the West. There have been 13 far-right terrorist attacks that have each killed more than ten people over the past 50 years, compared to 24 Islamist attacks, and three from other ideologies. Far-right terrorism is also more likely to be carried out by individuals unaffiliated with a specific terrorist group. Nearly 60 per cent of far-right attacks from to were carried out by unaffiliated individuals, compared to under ten per cent for both far-left and separatist terrorist groups.

There are some signs that political violence is becoming more publically acceptable, as the level of polarisation in society continues to rise.